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Abstract. In this paper we analyze the security of systems based on
modular additions, rotations, and XORs (ARX systems). We provide
both theoretical support for their security and practical cryptanalysis of
real ARX primitives. We use a technique called rotational cryptanalysis,
that is universal for the ARX systems and is quite eﬃcient. We illustrate
the method with the best known attack on reduced versions of the block
cipher Threeﬁsh (the core of Skein). Additionally, we prove that ARX
with constants are functionally complete, i.e. any function can be real-
ized with these operations.
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1 Introduction
A huge number of symmetric primitives using modular additions, bitwise XORs,
and intraword rotations have appeared in the last 20 years. The most famous are
the hash functions from MD-family (MD4, MD5) and their descendants SHA-x.
While modular addition is often approximated with XOR, for random inputs
these operations are quite diﬀerent. Addition provides diﬀusion and nonlinearity,
while XOR does not. Although the diﬀusion is relatively slow, it is compensated
by a low price of addition in both software and hardware, so primitives with
relatively high number of additions (tens per byte) are still fast. The intraword
rotation removes disbalance between left and right bits (introduced by the ad-
dition) and speeds up the diﬀusion.
Many recently design primitives use only XOR, addition, and rotation so they
are grouped into a single family ARX (Addition-Rotation-XOR). Among them
are SHA-3 competitors Skein [14], BLAKE [3], CubeHash [5], and the stream
ciphers Salsa20 [4]. It is a common belief that the mixture of these operations
gives a good primitive, if the number of rounds is suﬃcient. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no formal theory whether all three operations are
necessary and suﬃcient for this task.
We investigate this problem from diﬀerent points of view. Certainly, the most
interesting question is how secure the ARX(-C) systems are. So far, the most of
the analysis of ARX systems was made in the framework of diﬀerential crypt-
analysis [23,9,8], with a few exceptions where symmetric states were consid-
ered [1]. We investigate the security of ARX systems with a technique that we
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call rotational cryptanalysis, where we study the propagation of a rotational pair
(X,X ≫r) throughout the primitive1. Operations XOR and rotation both pre-
serve the rotational pair with probability 1, while the modular addition does it
with probability up to 38 , depending only on the rotation amount r. Therefore,
a rotational pair of inputs is converted to a rotational pair of outputs with a
probability depending only on the number of additions in the scheme. Hence, we
get a universal upper bound on the security of the ARX primitives.
The use of constants, which may not form a rotational pair, does not restrain
our analysis, but makes it more sophisticated. We show how reduced versions
of Threeﬁsh (the block cipher used in the hash function Skein) can be ana-
lyzed with rotational cryptanalysis, and our results basically are the best known
cryptanalysis of this design.
We also prove that the ARX operations with a constant are functionally com-
plete in the set of functions over Zn2 . In other words, any function can be realized
with modular addition, XOR, rotation, and a single constant (ARX-C ). We also
show that the AR systems, that do not use XOR, are theoretically equivalent
to ARX systems. However, we prove that they are less secure with the same
number of operations, because of the linear mod 2n−1 approximation. It is also
easy to prove that omitting addition or rotation is devastating, and such systems
(XR and AX) can always be broken.
This paper is structured as follows. We survey related works in Section 2.
We describe rotational cryptanalysis in Section 3 and then apply it to Threeﬁsh
(Section 4). Then we prove the completeness of AR and ARX operations in
Section 5. We conclude our paper with generic cryptanalysis of the AR systems
(Section 6).
2 Related Work
It is hard to survey all the research done on ARX systems, so we point out only
the most important. Relation between modular addition and XOR was studied
in the PhD thesis of Daum [12]. Dedicated approaches were applied in many
works, among them on MD5, SHA-1 [23,9].
The impact of rotations was independently studied in the cryptanalysis of
block ciphers. In the pioneering work on related keys by Biham [6] a rotational
pair of keys was considered. This approach was extended by Kelsey et al. in
several related-key attacks on block ciphers [15]. In these attacks the adversary
tries to ﬁnd pairs of plaintexts of form (P, F (P )), where F is the round trans-
formation, so this is not a pure rotational cryptanalysis.
An AR system RC5P was attacked with mod n cryptanalysis in [16], and
the property (1) was introduced in the same paper. The internal states were,
however, computed modulo 3, and the computation modulo 2n − 1 was only
brieﬂy pointed out.
1 The technique of rotational cryptanalysis has been known and applied before, see
Section 2.
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A common approach to cryptanalysis of ARX systems is linearization ([10,9],
see also the systematic treatment in [8]), when modular additions are approxi-
mated by XOR, and the resulting function is linear. In the diﬀerential cryptanal-
ysis there is no need to approximate the whole addition by XOR, it is suﬃcient
to assume that diﬀerence propagates in a linear way. The linearization approach
works worse if the diﬀusion is good, so that even in a linear model diﬀerentials
involve too many active bits. As a result, the probability of the approximation
becomes very low even for a single modular addition.
A systematic treatment of AX-systems can be found in the work by Paul and
Preneel [20]. It was demonstrated that all such systems can be broken with a
low complexity, since one can work with bits from rightmost to leftmost.
Related-key attacks were introduced by Biham [6] and were used in the prac-
tical break of WEP [22]. The key relations used in the attacks vary from ﬁxed
diﬀerences [17] to non-trivial subkey relations [7].
A rotational pair of inputs (though it was not named so) was used in the attack
on the compression function of Shabal [18]. However, it was traced only through
bitwise operations, and not through additions. Bernstein [4] explicitly prevented
from use of rotational pairs in Salsa20 by ﬁxing non-symmetric constants in
the input of the permutation. However, he did not provide any complexity or
probability estimates for this kind of attack.
The designers of the block cipher SEA [21] described the technique of rota-
tional cryptanalysis in 2006 and defended against it with non-linear key-schedule
and pseudo-random constants. A modiﬁed version of block cipher Serpent, with
key schedule constants removed, is vulnerable to rotation cryptanalysis due to
the bit-slice nature of the S-boxes [13]. Also, the rotational pairs were tested for
Threeﬁsh [19], but this did not result into a full attack.
3 Review of Rotational Cryptanalysis
In this section we describe a generic method for the analysis of ARX systems.
The main idea is to consider pair of words where one is the rotation of the other
one.
We denote the intraword rotation operations by ≪r and ≫r. A rotated
variable is then denoted by
←−
X and
−→
X , respectively. Now, let
−→
X be the rotation
of X by r bits to the right. We call (X,
−→
X ) a rotational pair [with a rotation
amount r]. It is easy to prove that a rotational pair is preserved by any bitwise
transformation, particularly by the bitwise XOR and by any rotation:
−−−−→
X ⊕ Y = −→x ⊕−→y , −→x ≫r′ = −−−→x≫r′ .
Now consider addition modulo 2n. The probability that the rotational pair
comes out of the addition is given by the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 (Daum, [12]). P(−−−→x + y = −→x +−→y ) = 14 (1 + 2r−n + 2−r + 2−n).
For large n and small r we get the following table:
r pr log2(pr)
1 0.375 −1.415
2 0.313 −1.676
3 0.281 −1.831
For r = n/2 the probability is close to 1/4. The same holds for rotations to the
left.
Now consider an arbitrary scheme S with additions, rotations, and XORs over
n-bit words. Then the following theorem holds under independency assumptions.
Theorem 1. Let q be the number of addition operations in an ARX scheme S.
Let
−→
I be the input I of scheme S rotated to the right by r bits. Then S(−→I ) = −−→S(I)
with probability (pr)q.
Proof. It can be proved by induction on the scheme size. 
We would like to stress that in order the rotational analysis to work, all inputs
to the ARX scheme should compose rotational pairs.
For a random function P that maps to Zt2 the probability that P(
−→
I ) =
−−→P(I)
for random I is 2−t. Therefore, we can detect nonrandomness if a function can
be implemented with q additions, and (pr)q > 2−t. For example, when r = 1
we get that any ARX scheme that can be implemented with less than t/1.415
additions, is vulnerable to rotational cryptanalysis.
3.1 Dealing with Constants
In contrast to random schemes, iterative schemes with identical rounds suﬀer
from slide attacks and their modiﬁcations. The use of diﬀerent round constants
is typical countermeasure. As a result, many designs explicitly use constants,
and we have to adapt our method to work with them.
Let us introduce the notion a rotation error
−→
E . In the further text r is a ﬁxed
rotation amount. We deﬁne
E(X,Y ) =
−→
X ⊕ Y.
Clearly, E(X,
−→
X ) = 0.
An addition of a constant may generate a rotation error (the exact probability
depends on r, the constant value, and which type of addition is used — modular
or XOR). On the other hand, a modular addition of variables also may generate
an error, and with some probability these errors compensate each other:
E(X + Y + Z + C,
−→
X +
−→
Y +
−→
Z + C) = 0.
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The probability is higher if the constant has low Hamming weight and its ones
are concentrated close to the positions where addition errors appear. It may also
happen that a constant is added by XOR and is invariant of the rotation: C =
−→
C .
Then the rotation property passes the addition of a constant for free.
The subkey indices in Threeﬁsh are examples of low-weight constants. How-
ever, they are not compensated by a single addition, only by two previous addi-
tions, which leads to an error in the adjacent key addition. We have to introduce
additional corrections in the key to cancel the impact of constants (see Section 4
for more details).
4 Rotational Cryptanalysis of Threefish
In this section we attack the block cipher Threeﬁsh with rotational cryptanalysis.
We demonstrate that a rotational pair of Threeﬁsh ciphertexts can be obtained
faster than for a random permutation, which provides both a distinguisher and
a key recovery attack.
4.1 Specification of Threefish
Threeﬁsh is a family of block ciphers underlying the compression function of
Skein[14]. Threeﬁsh supports three diﬀerent versions: 1) Threeﬁsh-256 — 256-
bit block cipher with 256-bit key, 2) Threeﬁsh-512 — 512-bit block and key, and
3) Threeﬁsh-1024 — 1024-bit block and key. Both the internal state I and the
key K consist of Nw (Nw = 4, 8, 16 for Threeﬁsh-256,-512,-1024, respectively)
64-bit words. The Nw words of the s-th subkey Ks are deﬁned as follows:
Ksj = K(s+j) mod (Nw+1), 0 ≤ j ≤ Nw − 4;
KsNw−3 = K(s+Nw−3) mod (Nw+1) + ts mod 3;
KsNw−2 = K(s+Nw−2) mod (Nw+1) + t(s+1) mod 3;
KsNw−1 = K(s+Nw−1) mod (Nw+1) + s,
where s is a round counter, t0 and t1 are tweak words, and
t2 = t0 + t1, KNw = 264/3 ⊕
Nw−1⊕
j=0
Kj .
Further in our analysis we ﬁx the tweaks t0 = t1 = 0.
The formal description of internal rounds is as follows. Let Nr be the number
of rounds. Then for every 1 ≤ d ≤ Nr
– If d mod 4 = 1 add a subkey by setting Ij ← Ij + Kd/4j ;
– For 0 ≤ j < Nw/2 set (I2j , I2j+1) ← MIX((I2j , I2j+1));
– Apply the permutation π on the state words.
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Table 1. Summary of the attacks on Threeﬁsh
Rounds Type Reference
Threeﬁsh-256 (72 rounds)
24 Related-key diﬀerential [14]
39 Related-key rotational Sec. 4
Threeﬁsh-512 (72 rounds)
25 Related-key diﬀerential [14]
32 Related-key boomerang [2]
33 Related-key boomerang [11]
42 Related-key rotational Sec. 4
35 Known-related-key distinguisher [2]
Threeﬁsh-1024 (80 rounds)
26 Related-key diﬀerential [14]
43.5 Related-key rotational Sec. 4
In the end a subkey KNr/4 is added. The operation MIX has two inputs x0, x1
and produces two outputs y0, y1 with the following ARX transformation:
y0 = x0 + x1
y1 = (x1 ≪R(d mod 8)+1,j )⊕ y0
The exact values of the rotation constants Ri,j as well the permutations π (which
are diﬀerent for each version of Threeﬁsh) can be found in [14].
The best known analysis [2] of Threeﬁsh-512 is 33-round attack in the related-
key model, and 35-round attack in the known-related-key model (Tbl. 1). The
designers of Threeﬁsh have changed the MIX rotation constants in the latest
tweak to get better diﬀusion. We note that our attack is independent of these
constants.
4.2 Attacks on Simplified Versions of Threefish
There are two places in the key schedule of Threeﬁsh where we encounter con-
stants: 1) KNw is obtained with a XOR of all key words and the constant
C5 = 264/3, and 2) the last subkey word KsNw−1 has a modular addition
of the round counter s. Hence, in addition to the original Threeﬁsh, we can
obtain three simpliﬁed versions by discarding these constant XOR and counter
additions. Our attacks are in the related-key scenario, where all the key and
plaintext words compose rotational pairs, i.e. if the ﬁrst key and the plaintext
have the values (k0, . . . , kNw), (p0, . . . , pNw−1) then the second (related) key and
the plaintext have the values (
−→
k0, . . . ,
−−→
kNw), (
−→p0, . . . ,−−−−→pNw−1).
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The simplest version of Threeﬁsh is without the XOR of C5 and the additions
of the round counters. We can ﬁx the rotation amount in the rotational pair to
1 in order to get the best probability — 2−1.415 per addition. A simple MIX has
only one addition, hence a round of Threeﬁsh-256 has only two additions. The 59-
round version of Threeﬁsh-256 has 2·59 = 118 additions in the MIX of the rounds
and 4 ·15 = 60 additions of the subkey words, so the probability that a rotational
pair of key/plaintext (with a rotation equal to 1) will produce a rotational pair
of ciphertexts is 2−1.415·(118+60) = 2−252, which is higher than for a random
permutation. Every right pair also provides information on leftmost key bits of
each key word, so we get a valid key recovery attack with a complexity of about
2252 encryptions. The same reasoning is applicable for 59-round distinguishers
for Threeﬁsh-512 which has a complexity of 2504 and to Threeﬁsh-1024 and 21008,
because these ciphers diﬀer from Threeﬁsh-256 only in the size of the state and
the key.
When the XOR of C5 is present, then the only diﬀerence is that we cannot
use the rotation amount 1 because C5 ≪ 1 = C5, i.e. the constant C5 is not
invariant of rotation 1. Instead we can use rotation 2, and get attacks on 50
rounds. The complexity of the attack on Threeﬁsh-256 is 21.67·(2·50+4·13) = 2253.8.
For Threeﬁsh-512 and Threeﬁsh-1024 they are 2507.6 and 21015.2.
For the version of Threeﬁsh without the constant C5 and the round counters,
we get much better results if we consider a weak key class, for which it is unlikely
to get errors during the modular addition. Let the three leftmost bits of each key
word be zero, and consider rotation to the left by one bit. Then the probability
that
←−−−−
X + K =
←−
X +
←−
K is equal to 2−0.28 for a random X , and so the total
probability for the full 72-round Threeﬁsh-256, the version without C5 and round
counters, is 2−1.415·2·72−0.28·4·18 = 2−224. The size of the weak key class that
we attack is 261·4 = 2244, so we get a valid attack on a very large key class.
Analogously, we can attack a weak key class with 2488 keys of Threeﬁsh-512 with
complexity 2448, and Threeﬁsh-1024 with a complexity 2950 (the complexity is
slightly higher because Threeﬁsh-1024 has 80 rounds).
4.3 Attacks on the Original Threefish
Let us try to apply rotational analysis to the original version of Threeﬁsh. This
means we have to deal with the round counters – low weight constants. In order
to bypass them we introduce corrections in the key pair. Let K be the ﬁrst secret
key. Then the second key K ′ is deﬁned as follows:
K ′i =
←−
Ki ⊕ ei
The use of rotational pairs with errors is illustrated in Fig. 1.
We have found experimentally, that the values of the corrections ei should
not be larger than 16 (otherwise they do not cancel the round counters). For
Threeﬁsh-256 and Threeﬁsh-512 it is feasible to ﬁnd by brute force the exact
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values for the corrections that cancel the counters with maximal probability. For
Threeﬁsh-1024 we took the values that were good in Threeﬁsh-512.
The corrections forbid to obtain clear formula for the probability of addition
of a rotational pair. Hence, we have found these probabilities empirically. We
have grouped two rounds with a subkey addition (round – subkey addition –
round), and by Monte Carlo method found the probability that a rotational pair
of states at the input of these two rounds and a rotational pair of subkeys with
corrections will produce a rotational pair of states at the output. Based on these
values, we have produced the probabilities of the best round-reduced rotational
pairs. The explicit round-by-round values of the probabilities are given in Tbl.
4 in the Appendix. The results are given for the original versions as well as for
the versions without the C5 (except in the case for Threeﬁsh-1024 where the
probability of the version without C5 is lower than for the original Threeﬁsh-
1024).
We can break 39, 42, and 43.52 rounds of the original versions of Threeﬁsh-
256,-512, and -1024 with complexity of 2252.4, 2507, 21014.5 encryptions respec-
tively. The attacks procedures follow the same algorithm:
1. Generate a random plaintext P and encrypt it on K;
2. Compute P ′ and encrypt on K ′;
3. Check whether (EK(P ), EK′(P ′)) is a rotational pair.
A rotational pair discloses information about leftmost key bits of every key word.
The plaintext P ′ is computed by the following rule:
P ′i =
←−
Pi ⊕ di.
The plaintext and the key corrections are deﬁned separately for all the three
versions of Threeﬁsh in Tbl. 2. The correction values for the version without C5
are given in Appendix.
Table 2. Corrections in the plaintext pairs (di) and the key pairs (ei) in Threeﬁsh
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Threeﬁsh-256
di 3 10 3 15
ei 6 10 6 15
Threeﬁsh-512
di 0 6 3 6 3 6 3 6
ei 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Threeﬁsh-1024
di 0 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6
ei 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
2 .5 means without the last subkey addition.
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>>>
KeyKey
Round index
>>>
Round d
Round d + 1
Key addition
Fig. 1. Rotational errors in the key addition layer of Threeﬁsh. Dashed lines contain
rotational pairs with errors.
For the versions with counters but without C5, again we only change the
rotation amount to 1, and obtain attacks on 44 and 51.5 rounds of Threeﬁsh-
256, -512 with a complexity of 2252 and 2506.7 encryptions.
5 Completeness of ARX
In this section we investigate which primitives can be obtained in the ARX
framework. We show that any function can be implemented with the ARX op-
erations and a constant 1. Therefore, there is no generic property that holds for
the ARX-C systems with probability 1, and any cryptanalysis method fails for
a reasonably large system. However, rotational cryptanalysis (Section 3) shows
that such a system should be much larger than expected.
Let us now analyze the ARX operations and start with a system of notations.
In the further text + always stands for modular addition. Let an integer n be
the word length, and denote an n− bit word by W . Denote also by F the set of
all functions to W :
F = {f : Wm → W |m ∈ N}.
We say that a set Q is a basis in F if any function from F can be realized by a
scheme with elements from Q.
Theorem 2. The set of functions {+,⊕,≫1, 1} is a basis in F .
Proof. We show how to realize an arbitrary function f ∈ F .
1. Realize si(X) = 00 · · · 0xi, where X = x1x2 · · ·xn. First we rotate X by
n− i− 1 bits to the right using n− i− 1 simple rotations. Then we add it
to itself n − 1 times thus getting xi00 · · ·0. Finally, we rotate the result to
00 · · · 0xi.
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Table 3. Attack complexities for diﬀerent versions of Threeﬁsh; the weak key class on
full-round Threeﬁsh
Cipher Round Constant Rounds Complexity
index 264/3
Threeﬁsh-256 no no 59 2252
no yes 50 2253.8
yes no 44 2251.4
yes yes 39 2254.1
(weak key of 2244) no no 72 2224
Threeﬁsh-512 no no 59 2504
no yes 50 2507.6
yes no 51.5 2505.5
yes yes 42 2507
(weak key of 2488) no no 72 2448
Threeﬁsh-1024 no no 59 21008
no yes 50 21015.2
yes yes 43.5 21014.5
(weak key of 2976) no no 80 2950
2. Realize all functions Mk(X,Y ) = 00 · · · 0(xkyk).
3. Realize all functions jC(X) =
{
00 · · ·01, if X = C;
0, else.
as follows. Let C =
(c1, c2, . . . , cnm). Then jC(X) =
∏
(xi⊕ci⊕1), which can be computed with
functions {Mk(X,Y )} and the constant 1.
4. Realize all functions JC1,C2(X) =
{
C2, if X = C1;
0, else.
as C2 · jC1(X).
5. Realize f as
⊕
X∈Wm JX,f(X). 
Theorem 3. The set of functions {+,≫1, 1} is a basis in F .
Proof. We only have to prove that ⊕ can be realized with AR operations. Indeed,
we realize s′i(X) = xi00 · · ·0 in the same way as in Theorem 2. Then we add
s′i(X) to s
′
i(Y ) and get xi ⊕ yi in the leftmost bit. Then we rotate this to the
position of xi and get the function Si(X,Y ) = 00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
(xi ⊕ yi) 00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−i
. Finally
we note that ⊕(X,Y ) ≡ S1(X,Y ) + S2(X,Y ) + · · ·+ Sn(X,Y ). This concludes
the proof. 
6 Cryptanalysis of Generic AR Systems
In this section we consider the AR schemes, which involve only modular addi-
tions and rotations (constants are admitted). Although they are theoretically
equivalent to the ARX systems, they are more vulnerable with the same number
of operations. We show that the resulting function can be approximated with
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a simple formula, and this approximation becomes invalid only after a large
number of additions.
The ﬁrst important instrument is the following observation made in [16]:
X≪r ≡ 2r ·X (mod 2n − 1). (1)
Let us note that addition modulo 2n is equivalent to the addition modulo 2n−1
if the sum is smaller than 2n−1 (which happens with probability 1/2). The main
idea is to replace in a scheme S all the modular additions with additions modulo
2n−1. With probability 2−q, where q is the number of additions in the scheme, a
new scheme S′ produces the same output as S. Finally, we replace rotations with
multiplications using (1). As a result, we get a scheme with only additions and
multiplications modulo 2n − 1. Since we multiply variables only by constants,
the resulting function is linear in its inputs.
Corollary 1. An AR scheme can be approximated by a linear function with
probability 2−q where q is the number of additions in the scheme.
6.1 Applications
Any AR scheme claiming n bits of security and having less than n additions is
potentially vulnerable to our attack. Consider, for example, an n-bit AR hash
function H with q < n additions. Given H(M) we substitute it with a linear
formula and solve a linear equation. If there is enough input freedom, we ﬁnd a
second preimage with complexity 2q.
An n-bit AR block cipher is also vulnerable to this kind of attack. Let us
replace all XORs in Threeﬁsh with additions (the constants remain). Then there
are Nw additions per round and per subkey addition, so we can break a 50-round
version, which would have 504 additions.
7 Conclusion
We have investigated security of ARX systems from both theoretical and prac-
tical points of view. We described a technique — rotational cryptanalysis —
that is very eﬃcient for ARX systems. The complexity of the rotational attack
depends only on the number of modular additions, and does not depend on the
number of XORs and rotations, nor on the rotation amounts. The rotational at-
tacks on Threeﬁsh-256, -512, -1024 (39/42/43.5 rounds out of 72/72/80 rounds)
are the best attacks on this primitive.
On the other hand, we proved that actually any function can be implemented
with ARX operations and constants. As a result, there is no attack that works for
any ARX system, though our rotational cryptanalysis demonstrates that secure
systems must be large enough. Roughly, a primitive claiming n-bit security must
have at least 0.7n addition operations in any implementation. Use of constants,
however, makes rotational cryptanalysis more complicated.
We also showed that though AR systems (not using XOR) are theoretically
equivalent to ARX, they are vulnerable to a linear approximation attack regard-
less of constants used in the primitive.
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A On the Probabilities of Rotational Characteristics for
Threefish
One part of the probabilities of the trails presented at Tbl. 4 is computed theo-
retically, and one part practically.
When the rotational pair does not have corrections, then we use the prob-
ability of addition deﬁned by Lemma 1. In the original versions (with C5) the
rotation amount is 2, so the probability of addition is 2−1.676. When C5 is ab-
sent then we use a rotation amount 1, and the probability of addition becomes
2−1.415. Two consecutive rounds of Threeﬁsh-256 have 4 MIX and each MIX
has one addition. Hence, two rounds with no subkey additions have a proba-
bility of 2−6.6. Analogously, for Threeﬁsh-512 and Threeﬁsh-1024 we get 2−13.3
and 2−26.6, respectively. These numbers translate into 2−5.7, 2−11.3, 2−22.6 for
the versions without C5.
When there are corrections in the rotational pair, we ﬁnd the probabilities
of two rounds (one round + subkey addition + one round) experimentally. The
probabilities for the round 1 (key addition + one regular round) are also com-
puted experimentally.
We have used to following corrections:
– for Threeﬁsh-256 without C5 in the key: 7, 2, 2, 6; in the plaintext: 2,2,7,6;
– for Threeﬁsh-512 without C5 in the key: 2, 1, 3, 1, 7, 1, 7, 3; in the plaintext:
7,1,6,1,2,1,2,3
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Table 4. Probabilities for the rotational pairs of diﬀerent versions of Threeﬁsh
Rounds Threeﬁsh-256 Threeﬁsh-512 Threeﬁsh-1024
original without C5 original without C5 original
1 −13.1 −10.5 −22.8 −21.6 −45.6
2− 3 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
4− 5 −17.57 −12.56 −29.47 −25.92 −61.48
6− 7 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
8− 9 −15.33 −13.95 −31.33 −22.68 −63.32
10− 11 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
12− 13 −15.60 −12.05 −29.73 −27.99 −61.68
14− 15 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
16− 17 −21.08 −14.17 −34.35 −25.81 −66.44
18− 19 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
20− 21 −18.46 −14.6 −37.25 −29.43 −68.82
22− 23 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
24− 25 −21.47 −17.41 −34.38 −26.89 −66.34
26− 27 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
28− 29 −21.55 −13.44 −36 −25.61 −67.31
30− 31 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
32− 33 −21.74 −16.64 −37.63 −26.74 −69.28
34− 35 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
36− 37 −22.96 −17 −38.17 −25.12 −67.79
38− 39 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
40− 41 −17.74 −36.24 −31.34 −69.64
42− 43 −5.7 −6.6 −11.3 −26.7
44− 45 −18.89 −30.60 −13.3
46− 47 −5.7 −11.3
48− 49 −2.8 −33.19
50− 51 −11.3
52 −5.7
Total 39 44 42 51.5 43.5
rounds
Total −254.1 −251.4 −507 −505.5 −1014.5
probability
